Space is important when dealing with encounters. We need not, in this connection, venture deep into the philosophical debate on the concept; that will have to remain for another occasion. Making a hasty sketch of this type of use of the concept is neither simple nor easy, and must, in a short article, be superficial and rather fuzzy. Nevertheless, I hope to show that it is a relevant and necessary enterprise.

The concept is one of the key terms in contemporary archaeology, and has actually been so since the beginning of the 20th century. The continued relevance of the concept in archaeology is visible not least in titles of books on archaeology from the last 30 years or so. At the same time, the concept has not been given major importance by most sociologists. The French philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1974), and later Edward W Soja (1996, 2000), tried to make a more explicit use of the term for sociology. However, when the “postcolonial” theorist Homi Bhabha (1994) elaborated the concept of Third Space, he did not relate to Lefebvre or Soja. There is an important difference in approach here, and this difference has an interest beyond a mere historiographical one, as I hope to demonstrate.

Social logics is another tricky concept, which has a relevance in discussing encounters, but also in relation to spatial organisation. In recent years, the philosophy of Alain Badiou has attracted wide interest, and his way of addressing social logics and the topoi are of great use here. Finally, we will address how a social logics in scattered, by looking at the works of Derrida and Bhabha.

This short article is “theoretical”, in the sense given to the word in archaeology. We will, then, first look briefly at the way space was used in early German 20th century archaeology, and then briefly comment on traditional
“geographical” debate on colonialism, and the criticism of these positions launched in the postcolonial debate.

**Kulturkreislehre and Kossinian Siedlungsarchäologie**

German-speaking scholars played a major role in introducing space as an important parameter in archaeology. The *Kulturkreislehre* (the Culture-Circles school) was developed in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Among its main proponents were Fritz Grabner, Wilhelm Schmidt, and the archaeologist Oswald Menghin. The basic idea was rather simple. Evolutionism is not a good model for studies of human culture. Ideas can only appear at one place, and diffusion is thus a major mechanism for social change. Following through the history of humans, there have been various cultural circles, each starting at a particular point in space, and spreading out over vast areas from that point. These circles generally appear at different points in time. Thus, they have followed each other. The earliest circles were far more primitive than the later. It is possible that one circle spread over into an area which previously was dominated by another.

In terms of methodology, the culture circle school made distribution maps, showing how different artefacts and other types of customs (e.g., kinship systems) of a particular circle have spread over vast areas. The lists of traits are often, as understood, a mixture of very different sorts of elements. There is no real argument on how the traits were integrated.

Oswald Menghin tried to apply this method directly to archaeology (e.g., 1934). To take one example, he defined a (“European”) Mesolithic circle, which had occupied areas from North Africa up to far northern Europe. Menghin, like other members of the school, avoided questions of integration as such. However, he does touch some issues related to it in a methodological and theoretical book from 1934. Here, Menghin argues that Jews are not to be accepted in Austria. Either, the Jews collectively must become Austrians, or they must leave. A culture must be pure; the mixture of cultures is bad. It should be mentioned that Menghin followed these convictions when he (for a short period) became minister of education in Austria (in relation to the German Anschluss).

While the Kulturkreislehre in a sense had global ambitions, Kossinian *Siedlungsarchäologie* had not. Siedlung in this context should be read as the homeland, the Heimat, more than settlement in general. The word Siedlung had to do with geographical location, the place on which (in this case) a particular People (Volk), or a particular Tribe, or subtribe, within a People, lived. Earth and land were of particular importance, space was not a general category, but linked to particular, specified areas. Further, Kossinna (1911) explicitly stated
that archaeology was only about Europe (and, he adds, *possibly* about Indo-Europeans to some extent). Mainly, archaeology should be about Germans. Kossinna was strictly opposed to what is today called ethnoarchaeology. Europe was unique from the very beginning, much “higher”. Kossinna was sceptical even of classic archaeology, since it distorted, in his view, real German archaeology. He, apriori excluded other regions of the world as topics for an archaeology (1911; cf. also 1928). His methodology was in part similar to that of Kulturkreislehre. It was about plotting on maps the distribution of artifacts (flint axes, or certain types of ceramics, for example), showing the distribution of particular “peoples” or “tribes”. These maps were generally of such a scale that large parts of Northern Europe (or even larger areas!) were included, and the amount of artifacts plotted relatively small. Given some knowledge (or supposed knowledge) of chronology, these maps were taken to indicate the origin and spread of a particular “people”. A certain artifact was, often with no arguments, taken to represent, say “Germans”, during the Stone Age.

Kossina’s archaeology, like Menghin’s, had political ramifications. Kossinna wrote political pamphlets, notably in the end of the First World War, in which he used his archaeology for immediate political purposes. He eventually also became a member of Germanist cultural organisations, close to the NDSAP. Some of his pupils became important names in Nazi-archaeology. Kossinna must be seen in relation to the German development in the latter half of the 19th century, with a remarkable economic growth, and the search for an identity for the relatively new state. What is most striking in Kossinna is the exclusion of human populations in vast areas of the globe, apriori, from archaeology.

Kossina plotted archaeological finds, particular types of objects on maps. Kossina explicitly wrote that archaeology only had to do with Europe, and particularly Germany. This trait is a very important element in his way to think archaeology (and the world, it might be added).

Kossina’s way of making archaeology came to be very popular in Germany but also beyond, notably in Sweden. But it affected archaeology in most countries. Even several archaeologists, who eventually came to attack Nazism, embraced Kossinna’s methodology. Gordon Childe, an archaeologist from Australia, who lived a large part of his life in England, was heavily influenced by Kossinna. Childe used various perspectives and made his own particular blend. In Childe there is British diffusionism, 19th century evolutionism, and even some influence from Marx (or, rather, from Engels); and perhaps, most importantly, a modified “Siedlungsarchäologie”. Childe wrote influential texts, and his arguments are often very good. Childe was very active as a political essayist, and at times expressed ideas about Aryan or European superiority. But his criticism of Nazi ideas are well-known. It should, however, be noted that he
often criticised kulturkreislehre in his more popular books, but seldom Kossina (cf. Childe 1936).

There is, however, I believe, still much to learn from Childe. His modified Kossinianism discussed “archaeological cultures”, defined by a particular set of artefacts, and their spatial distribution. Childes definition of culture became very popular in Anglo-Saxon archaeology, and was used in many countries, for example in India. Childes perspective is splendidly expressed in a description of what culture means in archaeology, using examples from the ruined 2nd World War Europe (Childe 1956: 16-17). The ruins of the common English home had a brick construction, and particular vessels could generally be found in them. Similarly, the bombed North Russian home from the same time period had a wooden construction and exhibited a slightly different set of objects. These two sets represented two cultures, Childe asserts. This formulation is indeed effective and somewhat congenial. I have found no better or more elegant definition of the traditional culture concept in terms of archaeology. While Childe does elaborate a more complex scheme, within which these “culture” groups are to be analysed, there are strong links to Kossinnas method.

To summarise, the “spatial turn” in early 20th century German archaeology established immediate links between a given People (Volk) and a certain geographical area, the Heimat. This link was conceived as palpable and immediate, and the link to “land” and “earth” was of greatest importance. In Kossinna’s vision, space is a fundamental part of analysis, but certain particular spatial units, not space as a general concept.

In post 2nd world war Anglo-Saxon and French archaeology spatial analysis slowly changed focus from large scale maps to the spatial analysis of more limited entities of study, like a Valley bottom (Willey’s Viru valley study in Peru is a case in point, cf. Willey 1953) or even individual buildings. This change in the scope of spatial analysis is a major event, and the consequences must be taken seriously. I will return to this below.

**Critique of colonialism: centre-periphery models**

Inspired by the process of formal de-colonisation of European colonies in the post Second World War period, there emerged a set of models for the interpretation of the exploitation of colonies. In all these models, space and geography are paramount variables. Analysis of colonialism often operated with the conceptual pair “centre-periphery”, in which the centre lived from exploiting the periphery. The entities were thought as physically separated entities, with a very distinct geographical centre exploiting the periphery. London, for example, was the centre of the British Empire, exploiting colonies at far away places. This way of thinking is still common-place (and, despite the problems involved in
Among the theorists dominating the debate in the 1970’s André Gunder-Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Samir Amin can be mentioned. Gunder-Frank started by discussing the dependent character of Latin-American nations. The backwardness of Latin America was to be explained principally by this dependency. It was, thus, important to build broad popular alliances to fight these foreign influences. Wallersteins magnum opus, *The World System* (1974-1980), in several volumes, discusses how the world came to be dominated by Europe from the 16th century. In this study, there is a capitalist system expanding over the globe, invading larger and larger areas. The logics of this system is in the focus of analysis, and the lack of independence of the periphery is stressed. In other words, the idea of the inclusion of the periphery in one system is the core of analysis.

Samir Amin mainly worked on the 20th century, focusing on economics, and discussed how Europe, the United States and Japan (and some other countries) exploited other countries. Amin discussed of course the exploitation of natural resources (with little or no retribution), and exploitation through the use of low-paid workers, both in industry and in other fields (eg.1973, 2003). Amin dwelled probably a bit more on the particular traits of the general economy in the periphery than did Frank or Wallerstein.

The centre-periphery model differs from Kossinna’s archaeological spatiality in several ways. Kossina also discusses cultural expansion, and it is even a major topic. But there is no attempt at identifying “structural” links between different groups. When there is a link, it is superficial, or a mere subordination, in Kossinna’s archaeology. There is no possibility for a partial integration between two groups. Both entities remain the same; they keep their “essence”.

The centre-periphery models stipulated a much more elaborate link, a structural connection. However, only few centre-periphery studies addressed the direct effects of encounters in detail. In short, the general system was in focus, and the interrelations were (strangely, in a way) of relatively little interest.

**Network and Nodes: Castells and Latour**

The centre-periphery models came into question from the beginning, but for the most part in the 1980’s. Latin American involvement in Africa was discussed (particularly by Brazilian companies), and the role of China as a potential new economic superpower was stressed. The general transition from Keynesian “welfare” economics, which gave the state an important economic role, to neoliberal economics, downplaying the role of the state, also played a role, as did the general “postmodern” trend.
The so-called network theory questions the use of traditional spatial perspectives in social theory. While many approaches to the social have taken situations occurring in particular geographical areas as the point of departure, and discussed how various factors within these entities relate to each other, network theory questions such an approach. In Kossinnas analysis, the Germans during certain periods fought against the Romans, or against the Slavs, and this had to do with the control over certain continuous territories. In the centre-periphery model, the geographical centre benefited from the exploitation of the periphery.

Manuel Castells is a famous sociologist, originally from Spain, and is well-known for a three volume analysis of the network society. Network theory stipulates, in Castell’s terms, that a set of interconnected nodes constitute a set. The network may, with Castell’s examples, be related to the activity of the stock market all over the world. Or it may be about the coca plantations, and illegal airports linked to these, and, of course, the cocaine market. These are examples of networks (Castells 1996:508). In Castells study, the network is a special stage in the development of the world. It is the characteristic trait of the “information society”. Castell admits there are social conflicts and social difference. But, in different to previous periods, at this stage, the social battle is primarily a cultural battle (Castells 1998:400). Castells does not do away all through with the concept of space. Some areas are still seen as the (extreme) periphery, being, in a sense, outside the “system” of the information society.

Bruno Latour has launched a more theoretical model, which includes the interaction between people and things. In Latour’s model, people and things at times make the same operations, and they can, in these cases, be said to be equal, they are actants (Latour 1993). One and the same actant can thus be a machine or a human being. Latours network model has been praised, but also severely criticised, particularly for equating humans and machines. Latour also uses the concept of node. In an early text, he spoke of the 18th century French explorer, trying to exploit the world, as a node. Wherever this individual set foot, the network is present. There is no centre of the network, only a set of nodes. Each node has the same “network quality” as any other (Latour 1987).

The network model, particularly in its more extreme forms, is intellectually inspiring, and has, beyond doubt, some valuable points. The question is if it is a sufficient model for analysing social relations. If we take the more extreme version, in which all analysis, independent of period or topic should be analysed exclusively by the network model, the problems are evident. Even for an analysis of the contemporary world, the setbacks should be evident.

Let me illustrate with an imaginary example. If a British colonial administrator came to live in an Indian town in the 19th century, his environment changed dramatically as compared to, say, London, or a small English town.
The food was not the same; it could not be, even if strong efforts were made. The landscape was different, the way people were dressed in general was different, and the buildings were not really of the same type, with few exceptions. Even if the administration tried to create small copies of England, they never succeeded. One of the ideas of being in India was to exploit it. One way was by using local servants, and they certainly differed from servants in, say England. And apart from these issues, there was the bigger question of how to cope with the population living in India, how to administer people in the plantation or the factory. Apart of dress, food, and the like, there were also differences in conduct. Well, this list could easily be extended. The point is simple. It cannot, from the point of view of immediate social action, be possible to “forget” the difference in geographical settings. At times they are more pronounced, at times less, due to various factors. But the geographical factor is still relevant. What seems of particular relevance is the interrelationship between people and how these are articulated in particular settings. In order to develop tools for another way of addressing the social and in particular the social use of space, many basic issues must be re-considered. In order to contribute to such a development we must turn briefly to the question of social logics.

**Unity or disunity?**

While pragmatic philosophers (Putnam, Searle or Rorty) tend to downplay the role of cultural difference, other types of approaches (like structuralism or hermeneutics) stress the fundamental difference between cultures. Marshall Sahlins is a case in point, when he, discussing the case of Captain Cook and Hawaii, argues on the “closed” character of an individual culture. Viktor Li has made an extensive criticism and argued interestingly on Sahlins and his critics, and points at the tricky problem of the relation between “cultures” (2001). What happens when two different sets of people meet, have an encounter? To disentangle this question, it is necessary to address the question of social logics.

Can we consider our environment as *one* world, in the pragmatic sense, or are there different, socially constructed worlds, with different rationalities or logics? I would like to stress that I do not find this an easy problem. I am a staunch materialist, I do not think I am necessary for the universe to exist, or for the universe to be thought about. And I am induced by the fact that certain other people suffer tremendously to think that there are measures we all can agree upon (cf. Mohanty, 2003, and Coole 1996).

In a physical sense, *the world* is. There are physical characteristics, which can be measured and discussed, and their effects discussed with a certain detail. And there seems to be certain common traits to all humans, even though they
are hard to define in detail, even though they have changed over the last 20,000 years. There does seem to be some general patterns in human behaviour. But they are very hard to define, and, further, we cannot exactly state at what point these patterns emerged.

In many ways, I find Putnam’s argument valuable and sound (Putnam 2000). But still, I cannot follow him. He does, as I see it, underestimate certain problems in human life, namely the relevance of the social. One problematic aspect in Putnam is that all human action is considered to be strictly intentional, that the world is still “Husserlian” and egological. While intention (of different “types” and scales) is of utmost importance, it is not enough in order to describe human action. But it seems fairly clear that, if we only use a general information of physical properties and processes (including biology), and some “general” ideas of human conduct, this information is not sufficient to describe or explain, and still less to understand, what humans have done in various historical circumstances. There is another relevant field, that of variation in social and cultural patterns. However, these patterns are hard to get at. Traditional models, like those elaborated by hermeneutics or structuralism, seems outdated and of little help. Thus, we must seek elsewhere for suitable models. Alain Badiou, a French philosopher, has, during the last 30 years or so, elaborated an alternative proposal, which has attracted growing attention during the last couple years. While not embracing his philosophy all through, I find it rather illuminating and interesting for the problems addressed in this article. I will, therefore, summarise briefly some of his ideas.

**Alain Badiou, the Infinite and the Multiple**

Badiou sees the “linguistic turn” as an obstacle for philosophy, as an obstacle for getting at what is (to get at, say, the social field). “Common language” may become a cage, a prison (1998:193) which hinder us to analyse important issues, or even to get at them at all. The use of language as a general model for the social, applied in much hermeneutics and in structuralism, was a major setback. Mathematics, then, is a major element in Badiou’s thinking. Badiou states that “Ontology is mathematics”. Ontology is the state of being. In another phrasing, Badiou writes that “being is what existence becomes if the world is mathematics” (Badiou 2004:236).

It is necessary to comment of Badiou’s understanding of mathematics. He understands logics as a part of mathematics’, not the other way round (Badiou 2004:3-58). There is no unified logic; there are different logics, within the large open field of mathematics. Mathematics teaches us about what must be said concerning what is; not about what is permissible to say concerning what we think there is. (Badiou 2004:16). With a polemical tone, he continues:
Mathematics provides philosophy with a weapon, a fearsome machine of thought, a catapult aimed at the bastions of ignorance, superstition, and mental servitude. (Badiou 2004:16)

It is still not completely clear what Badiou means by this reference to mathematics. To what extent is he making a metaphor, and to what extent is he actually talking about trying to make such mathematical models in practice? Be that as it may, what seems interesting is that he proposes another way of thinking about key issues.

The most important point in Badiou’s discussion, as I see it, is that he insists that it is necessary to see that there are different social worlds, and that our common language gives limits for our ability to identify, to find, another world (as it could be, for example, in archaeological evidence). While Wittgenstein became disillusioned when he saw the limits to given logical systems, and preferred to stay in the world of “common language”, Badiou believes it important to go beyond our inherited vocabulary and grammar, into the realm of the unknown, or new, different worlds.

In his large study *L'être et l'événement* (Being and Event) from 1988, Badiou addresses the question of what is, that of being (*être*). What is, the “being”, is to Badiou *an infinite number of multiples*. The multiples are any sort of “thing”, they cannot be reduced to a common denominator, they “have no One” in Badiou’s terminology. One multiple may contain other multiples, but the multiples can never be reduced as such, they cannot be defined as in terms of “atoms” or “monads”. These multiples build up the inconsistent multiplicity and the quantity of multiples can grow indefinitely. The infinite character of the multiple is one of the keys to Badiou’s philosophy. Badiou believes Deleuze to have defended a *Spinozian* philosophy, which requires the *absolute unity of Relation* (Badiou 2004:235), i.e. that everything always is related to everything else. According to Badiou, Deleuze’s world was one of unity, in which all events happened on the same surface (in the *folds*), so to say.15

We have, according to Badiou, no direct access to the multiple. The multiple is there to us in *appearance*, which brings us to the second part of Badiou’s major argument.

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15 Badiou *could be* understood as to question the general validity of an important law in physics: that energy cannot be created, only transformed. At some occasion, Badiou has commented that physicians are less open minded than mathematicians, that physics tend to create closed worlds of thinking.
Event and Appearance

The multiple is there for us in its appearance (*apparaître*). This appearance is a particular logic, a logic that defines a particular world, a “transcendental phenomenon”. In Badiou there is a certain echo from Descartes, the Kantian synthetic apriori, and the Popperian “objective knowledge”, in affirming that there are two modes. One is that of “things”, which have existence, and the other one is that which exists only in our thoughts. It is in this second order of thought that a world has its appearance.

Thus, there is a logics of worlds. These logics are of a special kind, they are constituted by a special field of distribution of “topoi”. There is no universe, and the world is not; there are worlds (Badiou 2004:217). While the multiples are infinite, one world is finite.

Within one world there are limits to what can be seen and what can be done. What particularly interests Badiou is how a change comes about, and what such a change means. Here he discusses various levels of intensity of transformations. A modification is the mode in which objects in the world appear (they can not be without some change). A fact is a transcendental novelty, but one endowed with a low degree of density. A singularity is a transcendental novelty whose intensity is strong, but which has few consequences. An event finally, is a singularity with consequences of maximal intensity (Badiou 2004:236).

The conceptualisation of Badiou is still in construction. A long awaited book, *Logics of Worlds* was published in 2006. Discussing the concept of the “transcendental” in his doctrine (a term Badiou seems to favour, rather than theory), he discusses what he calls a “vulgar phenomenology” to illustrate some issues. Part of his argument is based on a discussion on an opera (‘Ariadne and Bluebeard’, from 1906, made by Dukas on the basis of Maeterlinck’s novel). Here, the relation between different persons in the drama are discussed as intensities, as differences in intensities (2006, cf. 2004:189-219). All relations can be measured this way, Badiou believes. Thus, a given world is a relational network of differences, which give to each multiple an appearance. The “transcendental” is the operational set giving sense to the more or less of differences in a world. The transcendental is local, intra-worldly (Badiou 2004:197). An important point to Badiou in this context is that the difference at this intra-worldly level has “absolute” character, that there is a sort of zero, which makes these measures seem “absolute”. But there is also a maximum; no particular world can be infinite. At the same time, there is a possibility to think some things that are not in the given world (Badiou 2004:204).

In measuring differences there are three fundamental standards. In one case the conjunction is a commonality between two beings in some sense; another is when two beings are measured by a third; and, finally, two beings have nothing
in common, and the value is zero, they are disjoined. Badiou calls these measures inclusion, intercalation and disjunction (Badiou 2004:204-205). There is yet another concept, that of “envelope”, which designates a unit within a world, “that being whose differential value of appearance is the synthetic value appropriate to that part”. In this discussion, the concept of series appears (Badiou 2004:211, a concept which probably stems, in part, from mathematics, but also from Sartre). The series is an envelope containing beings whose appearance are very similar in relation to a “dominant” figure. The specific value of conjunction between one of the beings and the dominant being is almost equal to the average of all. Badiou here also develops a measure of “dependence” between beings in a world. Finally, he introduces a discussion on the concept of the reverse in a world, which is fundamental for his general argument. The reverse is not like the negation of Hegel, but has some resemblance to that concept. The fundamental difference is that the reverse appears within a world, it is not a general essence. All this discussion is largely technical, a characteristic of some of Badiou’s writing.

**World in Change**

In relation to an event (the maximum of transformative intensity) a world may fall apart, and a new “constellation” may appear, a new logics. The word constellation comes from a poem of Mallarmé, *A cast with a dice*, in which a new bright constellation of stars appears after a throw with a dice.16 Here Badiou also introduces a difficult concept, *Truth-Event*. This concept has been used in a variety of ways. It seems that a Truth-Event is an event which is undeniable to all persons in a world, or perhaps in various worlds, an event that calls into question the logics of a world. A Truth-Event calls for decisions and transformations. Badiou uses the French revolution as an example of a Truth-Event, but he also hint at that the so-called 9/11 event is, if not a Truth-Event, something very close to that. I guess that the Second World War also was a Truth-Event, in a sense, within this conceptualisation.

Badiou also argues politically in relation to a truth-event. There are, in the face of such an event, different ways to act. One of these ways is to try to stay with what emerged in that moment of truth, to be faithful to it. In a discussion on Paul and early Christianity, he argues about Paul’s fidelity to an event. In a similar vein, he talks about his own fidelity to the ’68 events in France. Fidelity

16 The poems of Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1898) are frequently used among French intellectuals. Just to quote one example, Derrida worked much on Mallarmé, cf. for example a piece called “La Double Séance” (which was originally a presentation in front of an audience, initially published in *Tel Quel* in 1970, later in *La Dissémination*, Derrida 1972a: 199-318).
to Badiou is, however, not fidelity to a given doctrine or to a given political party, but rather fidelity to the event as such. A Truth-Event may, then, give rise to a new world, or new worlds, with new logics. According to Badiou:

The universality of a truth is upheld by subjective forms that can be neither individual nor communitarian /.../ Inasmuch as it is of a truth, a subject subtracts itself from very community and destroys every individuation. (Badiou 2005b:24).

In the creation of a new world, antecedent identities are crushed and a new pattern emerges. Thus, in this type of transformation, older categories become obsolete and irrelevant. There is not a continuity of previous communities, which would mean that there is no “German prehistory”, nor an “American prehistory”, for example. In discussing Paul and early Christianity, an important point is the idea that anybody could become a Christian, independent of their origin, ethnicity or previous religion.

**Badiou’s Worlds**

The conclusions from the above are not directly straightforward, but nevertheless of great importance. It is necessary, I think, to look at the social as consisting of several distinct “worlds”, though they are based on multiples, of which several are, in many cases, very similar. These worlds have different temporal and spatial extensions, and varying levels of generality. To a certain extent (and Badiou would probably not follow me here) it may be correct to speak about an “archiworld” corresponding to the first humans. Though many things have occurred, and major change has taken place, there seems to be some continuity. On one hand, we have biological continuities, but we will not dwell on them here. On the other, there are some other “social” continuity. The scale and character of externalised products is particularly relevant, the trace of social worlds (Leroi-Gourhan 1964-1965, Derrida 1967a). What we deal with here is the formation of the social as a phenomenon. It could be that there are certain (though elusive and little understood) general patterns in the social sphere of the human. The small 30 0000 years old objects found at the Palaeolithic site of Sungir (Russia) are rather intriguing, in displaying several artistic forms later repeated frequently in different aesthetic contexts.

Badiou has his own way of addressing this problem. In tune with his general Platonian orientation, he compares a horse from the “30 000 years old” paintings in the cave of Chauvet with horses painted by Picasso. His conclusion is, to summarise, that they are different, they belong to different worlds. But there are also similarities, “invariants”. These similarities Badiou explains by similarities in what a horse actually is. Both the cave painter(s) and Picasso had
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come to grips with certain truths about the horse, the idea of “horsity” (caballéité is the French word, cf. Badiou 2006:25-29). As to the Platonianism of Badiou, and his insistence on the transcendent, I still have my doubts, and while his argument on horsity is interesting it is, still, only a general suggestion. Another French philosopher, Jocelyn Benoist, has discussed the limits to the concept of intention, and argues on the importance of certain material physical conditions in the elaboration of mental models. One of her examples is the idea of squirrels. The squirrel is not the same animal in Europe and in North America, and the association of the word varies accordingly. She remits this to the physical differences, the difference in behaviour of the different “squirrels” (2005: 256-260). Thus, the referential world is not the same. In a sense, Benoist argument lies close to Badiou. But Benoist avoids the argument of an absolute idea (“horsity” in Badiou), and simply refers to knowledge of the external world. It is probable that the horse has changed its behaviour relatively little since the cave paintings were made, and the similarities between the cave painter and Picasso is that they simply happened to observe the same aspects, and were capable of illustrating it. It is not necessary to speak about “horsity” as far as I can see.

Badiou would hardly subscribe to the term “archiworld”, but I still believe it a necessity for our argument, though this archiworld can never be an empirically known world. It is beyond our capacity to define it or to give it a chronological position. Any intent to define it will fail, and will also be an act of violence (the most violent of all acts, defining what a human is, one and for all).

Worlds may well be placed as a box in a box in a box, also in Badiou’s thinking, but a new world can also make previous boxes irrelevant, and create a new patterning in which “a subject subtracts itself from every community and destroys every individuation” (Badiou 2005:24). Any world has appearances, and relations between these appearances (321). Reading Badiou carefully, there are many different kinds of worlds at different levels and scales. There is, for example, a larger change occurring in relation to the French revolution. At another level, the battle at Gaugamèles (Alexander and Darius III), is also a world (296-305). At yet another scale, he discusses how a manifestation at the Place de la République today may create a world (cf. Badiou 2006:211-215). And, at yet another scale he addresses love and the couple, and discusses how a world may be created in such circumstances. Badiou himself admits that world is a very vague and little defined term (2006:123).

The world and the subject

What is in the centre of Badiou’s discussion is the concept of subject, or “subjectivated”. Several French thinkers have used this term; Althusser used the
term discussing how the state created subjects by “interpellation”, and Judith Butler is among those who made it popular (1997). Subjectivation is here a process whereby a social “agent” is created. This is thus a very important element in any social world. Butler particularly dwells on female subjectivation. Other examples could be “slave”, “serf” or “wage-labourer”, or, in another register “Swede”, “German” or “French”. Badiou’s use of the term is different. In order to get a bit closer at the concept of subjectivated in relation to that of world in Badiou, I will shortly summarise some of his discussion in Logics of Worlds (2006).

The existence of a subject is, in Badiou, a necessity for there to be a world. If there is something beyond “bodies and language”, this is the subject. A subject is what produces effects on a body according to a certain logics, productive or anti-productive (2006:53-54). The subject is related to an event, or rather to the traces left by this event, and the subject only exists in Badiou as transcendental, and in a relation. What is particularly difficult in Badiou is the concept of object, which is not the same as subject. To Badiou, there is a subject (with no object), and object (with no subject), and an objectivity to the subject (which is the body). In a sense, then, the body has a potential to be a subject. Badiou speaks of worlds without subject, worlds without people (at this point, I find Badiou particularly difficult, though I see that he does follow a logics).

An object, in Badiou’s terminology, is a multiple with a given “indexation”, a shared indexation within a given world (211-244). In relation to the manifestation in Paris, mentioned above, Badiou speaks of a group of anarchists with given characteristics as an “object”. Similarly, certain elements in a painting may constitute an object (the columns in a romantic painting Badiou analyses, for example). It is necessary, Badiou’s adds, that the “atoms” of the multiple are real parts of the referred multiple. The object is thus defined by three: a multiple, a given indexation, and a real material existence (not pure fantasy).

Objects have different characteristics in a Badiouan abstract sense, in relation to e.g., level of appearance, identity, symmetry and triangular inequality. I will not dwell at them at this occasion. A particular type of object is the corpse, the body. Badiou is particularly intricate here. Corpse is not only the physical human body but may also correspond to a new tangible “social institution” or “social phenomenon”, such as a new political entity, previously non-existing. The corpse is the material condition for subjection. The subjectivated body, in Badiou, is the body making a difference, capable of creating something new.

Badiou like to define himself in relation to various masters. One of those is Sartre. While he once was an ardent “Sartreanist”, he has a much colder relation to this master today. In a book on the 20th century, Badiou prefers Foucault
rather than Sartre (2005a). In Logics of Worlds he talks about Sartre, but very little. He mention Emmanuel Terray (a French anthropologist), once a fellow Sartrean, who is reported as having stated that he read Badiou’s book *Being and Event* in a Sartrean spirit. However, Terray is also said to be, today, critical of the idea of transcendence and Platon (580-581). Be this as it may, there is; as I see it, a strong Sartrean element in Logics of Worlds. First and foremost in the intention, in the political aim, which is often rather explicit. It is about the heroic, about looking beyond the rules of the day, about resistance, and about the role of the intellectual in all this. There is an air of Sartre in all this. But also at other levels Sartre is there, despite the sharp differences, stressed again and again by Badiou. Badiou tend to down-play the role of intention, which is one of the key issues in relation to Sartre. At times, however, he comes close to Sartre, for example when defining “the object”, or the “corpse”. Badiou is also fairly negative to stress the importance of the physical; he seems to share an aversion to things with the young Sartre.

Badiou also establish a relation to Derrida in his Logics of Worlds. In order to elaborate our argument, we must shortly address some aspects of Derrida’s thinking.

**Derrida, the trace, the text and “différance”: the limits to singularity**

We may say that Badiou establishes co-temporality, “the contemporaneous” in his concept of world. However, there are times within time in these worlds, as we have seen. Derrida’s philosophy largely had to do with a critique of the notion of co-temporality. Derrida initiated his fame with some studies on the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. In Husserl’s original argument for phenomenology, the point of departure for Heidegger and Gadamer, the individual spoke with herself, in a sense, in order to make an observation, to perceive. Derrida calls this an *ego-logical* philosophy (Derrida 1967c). This “relation to oneself” was not “social” and only involved the “subject”. In opposition to this position, Derrida stressed that all experience was social, that nothing could be experienced outside of a field of social conventions and signs. A key point in the argument against Husserl is that there is no “no-time” in which the subject can relate to itself, no “outside time” event (Derrida 1967a; cf. Hägglund 2002). Temporality is an irreducible condition. An element is constituted only when related to other elements. There can be no “pure” subjectivity since the subject must be constituted through duration in time, through temporal displacement. In the process of temporalisation, traces are constituted, which implies a spatialisation of time. Evidently inspired by Heideggers idea that death is an important marker for Being, Derrida believes
that the subject is a collection of memory traces, but also the presence of a possible future, which may eradicate traces. The I is, thus, the finite, the awareness of an eventual death.

The consequences of Derrida’s critical remarks on Husserl are manifold. One important consequence is that “pure” subjective intention is impossible, and that other variables, beyond intention, must be taken into consideration in all social analysis. Any subjective statement includes the use of social information in its construction.

**The critique of alphabetic thinking and the concept of text**

Apart of a critical reading of Husserl, Derrida defined his basic ideas in a critical discussion of structuralism. This approach had been inspired by Saussure, a French linguist, and his discussion of the difference between sign and signified and the langue/parole relation, discussed above. In this perspective, the spoken was the base for writing (the alphabetic sign used to make words), and the spoken was seen as a pre-condition for the sign. Language was thus, in this view, based on the spoken. According to Derrida this whole view was based on the presumption that the alphabetic text was a universal phenomenon. Through reference to Chinese writing and various historical examples, Derrida demonstrated that this was far from the case (Derrida 1967b). Derrida was particularly inspired by the French archaeologist André Leroi-Gourhan and his discussion on prehistoric communication (1964-65). Leroi-Gourhan was specialised on the old stone age, the Palaeolithic in France, and especially the so-called Magdalenian phase, the age of the famous cave art. To Leroi-Gourhan, early writing appeared as “mythogrammes”, in which several images run out in different directions from a determined centre. There is, thus, no determined order in which to read. He contrasted this to the linear construction of words and sentences in alphabetic writing. But he also had a vision, the idea that electronic machines (the computer) would open up reading, again making it possible to read in different directions. To some extent the homepage, as we know it today, is such a mechanism, but it is combined with alphabetic text.

Derrida elaborates a special concept, *différance*, in relation to his critical analysis of phonological analysis of language. Différance is a sort of mechanism producing difference (1967b: 1972a, 1972b:1-29). It is about the *spatialisation* of time and the *temporalisation* of space. Time produces spatial traces, but these may always be erased, since such a risk is always present when a trace is brought back to active use. Another key concept is that of *text*. Text is not what we commonly understand by written text, but rather the complex web of traces, constructed in a variety of ways, and in which information can run in between.
different formats. The linear written form is only one particular means of communication.

In a detailed analysis of the work of Levinas, Derrida makes the famous statement that the self is not identical to itself (Derrida 1967c). The process of temporalisation makes any assertion as to the “absolute sameness” impossible. The “same” always incorporate diverging elements. Derrida here talks about “the original violence”, the intent to make the same identical to itself. Much of what Derrida have written is to criticise various ways to state that the same is identical to itself. It may be mentioned that this argument of Derrida resembles that of Theodor Adorno in Negative Dialectics (1965). From this argument, Derrida thus criticise Levinas for not seeing that any subject is constituted socially, that there is no pure subject which can be related to a pure Other.

**Derrida and the critique of Lacan**

Derrida pointed at the limits to any sort of social system. The logics were never perfect or complete, they always failed to “close” the structure altogether. In this context he introduced the concept of *dissémination*, of spreading the seed (Derrida 1972a). In an interesting comment in a dialogue-book called Positions (1972b:112-121), he states that dissemination is the process of what resists to come under the spell of the Symbolic Order in Lacans terminology. What disseminates is what escape subjectivation, signification, law etc., all that which is dictated by the Symbolic Order in Lacan. It is what cannot even be conceived as imaginary or real. The dissemination is what will not “return to father”. Dissemination is the Text. It is not polysemic (accepted variability), it is beyond that, “pure” dissemination.

In another article, Derrida criticised Lacan explicitly. Making a structural analysis of a short novel by Edgar Allan Poe (*The Purloined Letter*), Lacan insisted that the Symbolic Order always works. In the context of the novel, it is about a letter gone astray, finally to be retrieved. Lacan asserts that a letter always reach its destinatory. Derrida opposes this idea, insisting that information may very well end up at the wrong place, causing problems to the Symbolic Order (1975). Derridas argument has much to do with the frame of the story (for example, the complex role of various narrators), the “surplus” elements in the story, left behind by Lacan (the existence of various letters, “fakes” and original etc.), and the general Text surrounding it. The short novel is not a universe in itself, rather it has similarities and connections outside it, and a rich content, far beyond Lacans analysis.
World or Worlds?

Social bonds seem to construct patterning, not always or only intentional patterns, but patterns which affect the way we handle problem resolution. Theodor Adorno once used a good example. Writing in the 1960’s, he mentioned the Vietnam War and the so-called “scientific management” of war, discussed by the US-war machine. In reports from the war, when discussing the failure of a given operation, the military often argued that the cause was that the enemy acted irrationally. While irrational action is more common than we often think, this is hardly a sufficient explanation here. What may have been the case was that the US-military lacked capacity of analysing the world or the “truth-play” of the enemy, the given field of logics within which the “enemy” operated (Adorno 1969:xx). Instead of staying in the known linguistic world (the situation), such a search must imply breaking the walls of the linguistic cage, as expressed by Badiou.

But Derrida has made an important contribution in pointing at the impossibility of “perfect” closed social logics. Thus, though there are and have been a large set of different worlds they are not entirely “closed” to each other, what Derrida called the Différance or Dissemination. Even Badiou has accepted this notion, and talks about these elements, those who will not fit into a given logics in a world, the inexistent (2006:571). These elements are there, but they are not recognised, they are there but not as part of the logics of a given world.

The inexistent is part of what allows for moving between different social worlds. In a sense, Derrida has created a means by which we may move between worlds by means of a (diffuse) world. But while worlds have logics or rationalities, there are no closed social logics to the world. In Badiou’s terminology, the world is inexistent (though it is there, and it affects us).

Having, then, established that there are logics of worlds, while these are not “perfect”, but always constituted by various sets (worlds in worlds), and by the existence of “différance”, we may turn to Homi Bhabha for an argument on the relation between “worlds”.

Bhabha and unhomeliness

Bhabha is well-known for his contributions to the debate on the encounter and (the critique of) “postcolonial theory”. Frantz Fanon, in Wretched of the Earth, a criticism of the European colonial politics in Africa, insisted on the embodied nature of exploitation, how it had affected people in immediate physical ways.

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17 In the case of war, it may of course be great luck that the military fail to get at the logics of the enemy.
Thus, he spoke about the need to retrieve histories and traditions, but he was not a romantic, had no wish to restore the past. What the colonial subject experienced was, in Homi Bhabha’s words, an “unhomeliness” (1994). This is not to say homeless. There is a physical home, but it is a scary, awful place. Bhabha uses an expression from Henry James, “incredulous terror” to describe this. In this colonial setting, there is no defined world in which to operate. Bhabha quotes Elizabeth Fox-Genovese discussing the frequency of murders, self-mutilation and infanticide in slavery plantations, and discusses the story of Beloved in Toni Morrison’s novel. The limit between public and private is of little relevance, and no evident cultural “code” is operative. Not only the colonised, but also the coloniser is largely lost in this terrain (even if the coloniser is, generally, equipped with more efficient weapons, and has the advantage of being able to go home, until this home is no more).

Slavoj Žižek, in a recent study, *The Parallax View* (2006), discusses the relation between “economics” and cultural patterns. Arguing on the Abu Ghraib prison (the US institution in Iraq, a result of the occupation), and the torture which took place there, Žižek discusses how the photographs taken by the torturers are like scenes, scenes from a certain type of underground US-culture, which elaborate on obscene fantasies. Thus, beyond the criminal act of torture, there is a cultural content to this, a non-official culture of the US. This is what Žižek goes at, these strange fields of thought and images, which are important in the life of, in this case, these torturers. Žižek summarises that if we intend to change the life at earth, it must occur also in this field. “The true act is to intervene in this obscene underground domain, transforming it.” (Žižek 2006:366). In this case, there is an unequal encounter, in which the “truth” of a certain world is established. In this case, the cultural clash is closed, and the possibilities for “action” of the prisoner are even smaller than the possibilities open for the 19th century slave.

The terror of this unhomeliness must not be forgotten, or left behind, in analysis. *It is the core of the issue.* But there is more in this. To Bhabha, this unhomeliness is a place in which change can take place, and I would like to phrase it “the root of change”. While Gayatri Spivak (1999) has been sceptical on the ability for the exploited subaltern to “speak” to the coloniser, not even the more drastic measures are observed as messages, Bhabha seeks to identify a potential for change in the field of “unhomeliness”. To use an expression from Žižek, we could say that “dialogue” is commonplace, but empty, while true communication works on the effects of a traumatic impact. Bhabha is truly Derridean here, in looking at the effects of a violent “*diffèreance*”, rather than a “speech act”.
The Third Space

The expression Third Space has given fame to Bhabha and the term is used frequently, also in archaeology. But there is not much of homogeneity in its use. It is thus necessary, for the purpose of this article, to construct a particular way of working the concept.

Bhabha writes that cultural enunciation is complex. It has a place of utterance, but this is crossed by the différance of writing (1994:36). I interpret this as the relation between a sort of localised social spatiality and a wider social text, which is used in transferring information. In Badiou’s terminology, there are local and wider worlds, and there is “the inexistential”. This field of différance makes it possible, at least partly, to “crack” the code of a world, to open up a closed logic. This is a social process, which often involves the encounter. In the Third Space such a process may take place. Communication, from I to You, passes through a Third Space of enunciation. In this Third Space, specific languages, cultural codes, social situations, and other conditions are operative, beyond mere intention. This Third Space incorporates ambivalence, fluctuation, instability. It is only in such a Third Space “true” communication can take place. The same symbol may be taken up and appropriated, translated, read anew. It is in this process a new subject is created, in Badiou’s terminology. It can come to be - but must not be - the beginning of a new world.

Third Space, Spatiality and Archaeology

But this Third Space is, according to Badiou, “unrepresentable in itself” (1994:37). This is evident by the logics of the argument. Soja has used this term in spatial analysis, but not inspired by Bhabha, but rather by Lefebvre, a French philosopher, who used it for other purposes. Third Space is used, in Soja, in an immediate, non-mediated way, in relation to human life and physical entities. Bhabha’s Third Space is, on the other hand, not true spatiality; it is at a crossing between a locality (spatiality) and a différance (temporality). Further, Bhabha’s Third Space is unrepresentable, precisely because it is not a representation, or a “world”, but the scattered pieces of representation(s)/world(s).

Thus, applying Bhabha’s Third Space to archaeology is a great challenge. Soja was right in insisting that the social sciences must take space seriously. But archaeology has since far back used space as a key concept. The issue in archaeology is to change the ways we work the concept, to start to get at the intricacies of space. We must finally abandon the search for absolute and eternal social units, defined by their spatial limits. But this must not induce us to adopt a strict network analysis, in which space is dissolved. Traditional sociology (e.g. Giddens, Badiou) has a point in stressing the difference between the local entity
of humans and the wider world(s). The local, geographically anchored, is a suitable point of departure for analysis, searching for patternings, which, subsequently, are compared to other similar case studies. Such an approach is not foreign to archaeology. What I suggest is that archaeology take this methodology, which has been used, but seldom theorised, in a more systematic fashion. What must, then, be in focus are both worlds and différence. And, in the case of an encounter, we must search the unhomely – and there is no better place to start than in the analysis of living houses, in the “home”.

There is no space here to enter archaeological examples. Some short comments will have to suffice. In a case study on a Northwest Argentinian example, I have tried to start to elaborate an example in an archaeological analysis of a “Third Space” (Cornell & Galle 2004). The case is taken from the locale of El Pichao in the Calchaqui Valley system, a sub Andean semi desert. In the beginning of the 15th century there was a large densely habituated settlement at this location. There is a wide variability, attesting for various “subworlds” in operation, but there is, at a general level, a certain degree of homogeneity in e.g. standards for the construction of houses, in ceramics and in lithics. There were several units of rooms making up something like individual farmsteads. They all exhibited particular traits, but also large similarities, particularly in the use of internal space. At approximately 1500, or slightly before, there appear, within some units, new traits. These include spatial re-accommodation (closing openings, digging holes in the floor in small rooms), and making burials of children inside the houses, with few accompanying goods, but including some ceramics differing from those previously used at this location. In this case, the new ceramics is inspired by Inca imperial styles (from Cuzco, Peru). The re-accommodation and new uses of space may be analysed in terms of a “Third Space” operating in space and on materialities.

We know from written sources that the Inca had a presence in this region, but we still know little about the details of this expansion. In the case of El Pichao, it may be suggested that certain actors from a local or regional frame operated using the Inca phenomenon for certain more or less explicit purposes, related to power (or possibly for trade, or for both purposes). There is, thus, a local encounter of different worlds, which give material traces, which operates in materiality. This encounter gives us shattered material traces of a Third Space. This Third Space does not appear in spatially continuous units, but rather in particular bundles at particular spots.

Searching for the Third Space must not be a search for a predefined set of objects. Rather, it must be the search for what is not a pre-existing pattern, for new combinations of traits. This requires a methodology very different from that of Kossinna or Childe. While the origin of elements is of interest, the most
interesting part is how these elements are combined, and how the local world(s)
are related to the larger play of différance.

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